Brentano on Space by Kavanaugh, Leslie
39
Architecture and Phenomenology, Autumn 2008, pp. 39-50.
The End, or Fin-de-Siècle Vienna
Suddenly, the unthinkable was not only possible, but 
an actuality. The Hapsburg Empire unexpectedly 
was no more after centuries of being an established 
fact of existence; something perhaps to protest 
against, something to ‘push’ against, yet something 
always to rely upon. And abruptly the solid ever-
present fact of it was nothing but dust.
In Die Welt von Gestern: Erinnerungen eines 
Europäers, Stefan Zweig tries to reconstruct an 
account of the unthinkable – the end of the Hapsburg 
Empire. He recounts after-the-fact what persons of 
a younger generation already had forgotten, those 
who never knew the taken-for-granted realness of 
impenetrable structures of empire, the ‘certainty’ 
and immutability of the governing classes. Indeed, 
Zweig explains, ‘Sicherheit’ – certainty, security, 
stability – was the Highest Good for the subjects in 
the Austrian-Hungarian world. Yet it was as though 
the sheer historical determinism was hurling itself 
towards the abyss of time, slowly and inevitably, 
and one day the Empire was over the edge and no 
more.
Into this fray came Franz Brentano (1838-1917), 
a ‘typical’ subject of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. 
He was born in Marienberg in Prussia in an Italian-
German family. Shortly after his birth, his father 
moved the family to Aschaffenburg, due to conflicts 
with the Prussian government concerning church 
matters. Here Brentano quite happily grew up in a 
quiet and stable environment, educated in various 
German universities, and receiving his doctorate 
from the University of Tübingen in 1862. In 1864, 
Brentano took the vows of the priesthood in Würz-
burg and became a Privatdozent at the university 
there. Yet, although he would remain a devout 
believer until the end of his life, Brentano allied 
himself with a group of theologians that argued 
against Papal Infallibility. As a point of principle, no 
biblical or theological argument could be sustained 
that would show that the Pope was not a man, 
and as a man, inherently imperfect and capable 
of sin. Brentano became embroiled in this debate 
– on the wrong side as it were, for Papal Infallibil-
ity stands still to this day as a doctrine of the Holy 
Roman Catholic Church. Subsequently, his position 
at the University of Würzburg became untenable. 
Experiencing an existential crisis, Brentano felt 
that he could no longer reconcile the doctrines of 
the Catholic Church with his innate character as 
a searcher of truth, and as a developing philoso-
pher of clear reason and induction. Yet in a world 
where the Catholic Church and the university were 
inextricably intertwined, he was forced to find other 
employment. This other university would become 
the Universiät Wien, from 1875-1894, where he 
was named Professor ordinarius. Brentano eventu-
ally married, and this decision for an ex-priest was 
most problematic, not causing him to loose his posi-
tion at the Universität Wien as such, but his status. 
First he lived within walking distance from the old 
university buildings on the Jesuitplatz, in modest 
accommodations in the Erdberstrasse 19, not far 
from the river, where he loved to walk and to talk 
Brentano on Space
Leslie Kavanaugh
03
40
for the city, with enormous parks, statuary to past 
monarchs and eclectic architecture, looked back for 
legitimisation to empires past. Actual regeneration 
was not planned. The technological advances of 
modern life, such as electric lights, tramways and a 
sewage infrastructure, were not planned because of 
a conservative sense of continuity. These projects 
would not be implemented until the beginning of the 
twentieth century. Further regeneration in terms of 
housing an exploding population had no place in the 
plans either. In a city of two million persons (more 
than inhabit Vienna even today), poverty and over-
crowding were common. ‘Sicherheit’ for the majority 
meant merely inescapable and unchanging misery. 
For the wealthy few, mostly bankrupt, including the 
Hapsburg dynasty through wasteful expenditures 
on the army, disastrous military campaigns and 
the stockmarket crash of 1873, the late nineteenth 
century was the ludic hysteria before the end.
In the remnants of pretensions to certainty, cracks 
began to appear through which would come some 
of the most innovative thinkers, artists, composers, 
writers and architects ever witnessed within a single 
generation. They would begin to ask: ‘what can be 
known for certain about objects of sense experi-
ence?’. Behind the shadow-play, the hidden urge 
to truth, to pure unadulterated truth, emerged. Adolf 
Loos said ‘ornament is crime’; Karl Kraus would sati-
rise the Viennese propensity to self-deception, and 
Mahler would express raw naked pathos instead of 
false sentimentality.
At the end of the nineteenth century, Franz Bren-
tano developed a philosophical method that would 
be a sort of middle way between the idealism inher-
ited from Kant, the ontological gap inherited from 
Descartes, and a brute materialism advocated 
primarily by the emerging hegemony of scientific 
procedure. The question was (and is): What is 
my relation to the world? Is the world completely 
‘out there’ and then a matter of discovery? If this 
is the case, then a philosophical account needs to 
about philosophy with students.1 Later, he conven-
iently lived just inside the ring on the Oppolzergasse 
6, diagonally across from the new Universität build-
ing, in the complex with the City Hall [Rathaus] and 
the new Parliament. 
The entire ring was constructed after the 1848 
rebellion that rose up in Vienna at about the same 
time that all over Europe the workers and the bour-
geois were demanding a surcease to repressive 
measures and free elections in a democratic system 
of government. This popular uprising was brutally put 
down, and draconian measures of  control followed, 
including the cessation of the freedom of speech and 
assembly. From the 1850s onwards, the so-called 
Grundzeit, the ‘foundational period’, attempted to 
efface the vehemence of the 1848 malefaction, and 
saw the breaking down of the old city fortress walls, 
the re-routing of the river into manageable canals (die 
Wienflussregulierung), and the rapid construction of 
more than 500 buildings along what is now known 
as the Ringstrasse in Vienna, including precisely the 
above-mentioned Parliament (although this would 
be regularly dismissed from holding representative 
assembly), the Rathaus (City Council Chambers), 
the new University of Vienna building (although still 
controlled by the Jesuits), and the Volkstheater (a 
necessary distraction for the Viennese who loved 
the glittering schauspiel).2 Further along the ring 
were the Opera, the Academy of Fine Arts, the 
Academy of Applied Arts, the Museum of Fine Arts, 
the Museum of Natural History, and various palaces 
of the aristocracy. Corruption was rife. However, 
this décor-building chiefly meant the superficial, 
albeit costly, beautification of the decaying Empire, 
and was in effect a schaudekoration. This massive 
urban generation project could not be considered a 
‘renewal’, but rather an appeasement, a last gilding 
of the rotten structures that would be doomed to 
collapse. The squelching of the revolution and of the 
discontent leading up to it was not to be placated 
in a facile manner by turning Vienna into a City of 
Dreams. One may also note that these projects 
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logian, Brentano undoubtedly would have known of 
the uses to which this term was put in the Scholastic 
tradition, namely with Thomas Aquinas,5 and much 
research has recently been completed tracing the 
etymological developments of the term intentio.6 
Also, a homogeneous definition of ‘intentionality’ for 
Brentano is difficult to determine, the case being of 
course one of the continued development of thought 
by an extremely dedicated thinker.7 Yet, in brief, 
no doubt the term intentionality was resurrected 
by Brentano and put to use in order to explain the 
relationship between mental acts [psychisch] and 
empirical phenomena [physisch]. 8 Even though both 
the word ‘intentionality’ and ‘phenomenology’ would 
be given a different meaning by one of Brentano’s 
students, Edmund Husserl, I would argue that the 
most profound influence on Brentano’s conception 
of intentionality [‘Die intentionale Inexistenz’ - inten-
tional in-existence9] is in fact Aristotle. 
Aristotle remained throughout Brentano’s life a 
continued source of admiration and inspiration. 
Brentano’s extensive study on Aristotle’s de Anima 
published in 1867,10 and specifically the notion of 
nous poietikos, forms the beginning point of Bren-
tano’s conception of intentionality [intentional 
in-existence]. Brentano, too, deeply held the ideal 
of the unity of sciences, each with its own realm 
and methodology, yet each unified into what was 
knowable. Exceedingly important is the realisation 
that in the late nineteenth century psychology was 
becoming established as an independent, autono-
mous science. Let us not forget that Brentano was 
in close acquaintance with Meynart, the clinical 
tutor of Freud, and that Freud himself attended 
many lectures of Brentano in Vienna. The univer-
sity was only a short walk away from Freud’s home 
and practice on the Bergstasse. The term psychol-
ogy comes from the Greek, psuché, meaning the 
soul, and logos meaning a reasonable account, or 
what we would now call ‘science’; psycho-logy is 
the explanation of the what is the soul, what are its 
faculties, and how it operates.
be constructed that explains how we can know the 
world. Is the world, on the other hand, completely ‘in 
here’, in my mind – the world being a mere repre-
sentation of sense data? If this is the case, then a 
philosophical account would still need to explain how 
the world is constituted in my mind. Both accounts 
had failed historically. Furthermore, both accounts 
could not explain the relationship between my ‘mind’ 
and other ‘minds’. This impasse, this aporia, was 
the birthplace of phenomenology.
Brentano sought a third way between the physical 
‘out there’, and the psychic3 ‘in here’, in my mind. 
For Brentano, the physical and psychic are not radi-
cally different, rather two sides of the same coin as 
it were.4 Any object ‘out there’ in the world is known 
to us only by first directing our attention toward it, 
then perceiving it in some way with one or all of our 
five senses, and then getting a hold on it in our mind 
through some kind of representation of the object. 
Therefore, any consciousness of an object is always 
a consciousness of a specific object. This intrin-
sic connection links that which is thought (noema) 
with the conscious thought or intellection (noesis); 
to think, to purpose, to intend (noeo) with the mind 
(nous), the thinking/perceiving/sensing part of our 
soul in Aristotelian terms. Brentano uses in his work 
of 1874, the Psychologie von empirischen Stand-
punkt, the term ‘Die intentionale Inexistenz’, which 
is already inherent in the ancient Greek derivatives 
of nous, for to think is also purposeful. As such, the 
will to know becomes critical; the world of sensible 
phenomena ‘appears’ to us, and our act of intention, 
our ‘attending-to’ the world, makes available objects 
of experience to our mind. The task of philosophy, 
then, is the description of the conscious experience 
or consciousness-of more accurately, with a method 
that Brentano will call Descriptive Psychology.
The account of the relation between the psychical 
and the physical, termed by Brentano as ‘inten-
tionality’, is partly derived from the Scholastic term 
intentio, which means ‘directed toward’. As a theo-
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what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the 
intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and 
what we might call, though not wholly unambigu-
ously, the reference to a content, direction toward 
an object (which is not to be understood here as 
meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every 
mental phenomenon includes something as object 
within itself, although they do not always do so in the 
same way. In presentation [Vorstellung] something 
is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or 
denied, in love [something is] loved, in hate [some-
thing] hated, in desire [something] desired, and so 
on…. The intentional inexistence is characteris-
tic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical 
phenomenon exhibits anything like it.12
With this citation, Brentano clearly follows Aristo-
tle13 in tying together thought with objects thought 
about; sensibility with the sensation of something; 
affectivity with a feeling about something, and 
perception with the perceiving of an object. The 
only discrimination between these pairs is that 
the physical object has no ‘intention’ in Brentano’s 
terms; that is to say, that the consciousness of only 
exists in, or immanently, as an object in the mind. 
Psychical phenomena are always characterised by 
their relation to an object. McAlister explains that 
Brentano’s intentionality thesis was not primarily 
about ‘the objects of mental phenomena, but about 
the fact that mental phenomena are by their very 
nature relational, while physical phenomena are 
not’.14 Indeed, precisely this question about rela-
tionality was the original impetus for Brentano’s 
phenomenology: what is the relation between my 
soul/mind and the world?  McAlister goes on to say 
that, strictly speaking, Brentano did not mean that 
physical as opposed to psychic phenomena have 
absolutely no relations, but that they do not have 
the relation of embeddedness of the object in the 
mental.15 Physical phenomena have relations of a 
differing sort – that of space, time, magnitude, conti-
nuity, infinity, etc. And it is to these relations that we 
will now turn – specifically, Brentano on space. 
In de Anima (meaning the soul, psuché) Book 
3;V (one of the most troublesome passages in all 
of Aristotle), Aristotle says: ‘For in the case of things 
without matter, that which thinks and that which is 
thought about are the same; for speculative knowl-
edge is the same as its object’ (430a3-5).11 This is 
not to say that the mind and the body are the same 
thing, but that they are ‘common’. The psuché, soul, 
needs the body in order to perceive, to sense, to 
think, but the soul or the mind is ‘separable’, chor-
ismos, always in relation to the body, but not the 
same. The thought is identical with the thing thought 
about. Or, as Brentano will state it: consciousness 
of an object is always consciousness of an object – 
these two being ‘separable’, but indivisible. In The 
Psychology of Aristotle, Brentano preserves the link 
between the thing that thinks (nous) and thinkable 
things (noeita). The mind (nous) is identical with that 
which is thought (noema). In Aristotle’s philosophy, 
Brentano takes inspiration from this psychology in 
order to provide the bridge between mental acts 
[psychisch] and sensible phenomena [physisch]; 
the link or relationship which he calls intentional 
in-existence. I have expressly hyphenated the word 
in-existence, contrary to other English translations, 
in order to highlight that Brentano’s conception of 
intentionality did not mean to suggest that mental 
acts, feelings, intuitions, sensations, etc. were not 
‘real’ or existing; rather, the very thing that char-
acterises psychic or mental representations of an 
object is the fact that, for Brentano, they include 
something of the object in themselves. They are 
immanently existing intentionally, and this inten-
tionality sets them apart from objects, for objects 
have no intention, no ‘directed-towards’, only minds 
can have intention. What distinguishes the physical 
from the psychic is the fact that only the psychical 
has ‘intention’.
Brentano’s well-known citation from the Psychol-
ogy from an Empirical Standpoint, states clearly:
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by 
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thoughts19 and correspondence with former students 
Anton Marty and Oskar Kraus, as well as Ernst 
Mach, entitled Philosophische Untersuchungen zu 
Raum, Zeit, und Kontinuum.20
The collection is organised in three sections: 
the continuum, time and time-consciousness, and 
finally, space and time. The topic of time itself, 
and memory, including Brentano’s famous theory 
of proto-aesthesis, receives the majority of atten-
tion. However, in this discussion, we will focus on 
Brentano’s consideration of space.21 Space itself 
is a complex topic, but simpler in the sense that it 
has remained relatively less confused as to Bren-
tano’s actual thoughts on the topic, as opposed to 
his student Husserl, and his student Heidegger, 
who both extensively treated the topic of time, 
not to mention Freud’s famous works on repres-
sion and memory. This worthwhile study will need 
another opportunity. Here we will focus primarily 
upon space.
As usual, Brentano goes to work like Aristotle: he 
sets out the positions of his predecessors, identifies 
the weaknesses in their argument, and then finally 
characterises the precise nature of the problem 
to be solved. In the section entitled “What we can 
learn about space and time from the conflicting 
errors of the philosophers” (dictated 23 February 
1917 - which is to say just before he died on 17 
March 1917 - these can literally be seen as his last 
thoughts on the matter), he sets out the problems of 
space and time.
Firstly, Brentano explains the terminology of space 
and time. The ancient Greeks had the words topos 
and chronos, which are generally speaking trans-
lated as ‘place’ and ‘time’ in English. In German, 
alternatively, for topos is the possibility of transla-
tion into Raum, Stelle or Platz, and for time, Zeit. 
Actually, Brentano uses the German expression, 
die phänomenale Lokalität (the phenomenal locali-
sation). Also, it must be said, the ancient Greeks 
Brentano outlines the six types of relations:16
1. Collective Relations (whole-part) 
2. Accidental Relations (whole-part in the sense of 
modal logic)
3. Causal Relations (cause-effect)
4. Intentional Relations (thinking-thought)
5. Continuity Relations (border-bordered)
6. Comparative Relations (magnitude [large-small], 
ethics [good-bad], aesthetics judgements [beau-
tiful-ugly], etc. – actually for Brentano not a true 
relation.
Obviously, this schema indicates that the inten-
tional in-existence relation is an important part of 
the relatedness of all phenomena – the physical and 
the psychic; the question as to how the mind, or the 
materially unextended, relates to the phenomenally 
extended, and is a continuity relation. Brentano in 
this regard is highly inspired by Aristotle’s Physics, 
where it is argued that all physical phenomena 
are continuities; that is to say, place, time, motion, 
magnitude, infinity, and continuous generation.17
Brentano on Space
The philosophical issues of the ontology of space 
and time would engage Brentano his entire life as a 
contemplative philosopher. Many of his thoughts on 
this subject are not published but have had extreme 
influences upon his students, specifically Anton 
Marty’s studies on space, and Edmund Husserl’s 
studies on internal time-consciousness. Nor was 
Brentano estranged from the emerging physics of 
his day; one of the most extended treatments on 
space and time comes from his engagement with 
and criticism of the physicist Ernst Mach’s distinc-
tion between mathematical space and time and 
experiential/sensational space and time. This was 
published in Über Ernst Machs ‘Erkenntnis und 
Irrtum’, which was dictated from 1905-6.18 Yet 
the most accessible collection of texts that reveal 
Brentano’s last thoughts on the topic are collected 
in the posthumously published volume of dictated 
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of phenomenal existence – a difficulty it must be 
said that remains to this day. God, of course, having 
no spatial extension and existing in eternity, cannot 
in principle be ‘in the world’.
Given the dissension of historical views, Brentano 
turns to that which is most apodictic in his system of 
philosophy, the intentional in-existence. Only in the 
objects of experience can we be certain, and these 
objects phenomenally are precisely those that are 
apprehended in the inner perception of time, and 
the outer perception of space. In following Bren-
tano’s notion after Aristotle that thinking is always 
thinking of something, one could say that one intuits 
something, and this something is always the rela-
tion between the individual consciousness and 
‘the world’. Furthermore, that which one perceives 
corresponds to the perception of others. One could 
observe, indeed, as an object of experience, the 
consciousness of others through various ‘repre-
sentations’, including language. And it is precisely 
this ‘appearing’ of phenomenal experience, which 
Brentano attempts to define and to describe. In this 
analysis, he briefly explicates his ‘theory of projec-
tion’, where he takes into consideration the paradox 
of an individual perception/thought of every thinker, 
married into an assemblage of the unity of continuity 
in space and time.25 Indeed, ‘there is lacking [Bren-
tano says], every absolute differentiation, though 
relative determinations are given multifariously’ in a 
phenomenal continuum.26
In this regard, Brentano follows Leibniz. However, 
first a point of clarification. Brentano uses the term 
‘relative’ [Relativistische] to describe Leibniz’s philos-
ophy of space and time. Strictly speaking, ‘relative’ 
applies to twentieth-century physics, such as that of 
Einstein, which is in fact a ‘relative’ space-time in an 
absolute infinite container, and as such a revision 
of Newton’s mechanics. Leibniz, on the other hand, 
argued for a ‘relational’ notion of space and time, 
and as such comprises a comparatively unexplored 
avenue in the history of physics. For Leibniz, the 
had no term for ‘space’ as such.22 Rather, topos is a 
specific determination of ‘place’, individuated to the 
existence of a specific entity. For Aristotle particu-
larly, space was not infinite, rather bounded by the 
divine heavenly spheres. In speaking about space/
place and time, Brentano outlines the fact that there 
were various determinations of these terms histori-
cally, some more comprehensive than others, yet 
a unified conception is not possible. Consequently, 
in German, an einem Ort [at a location] and in 
einem Raum [in a space],23 would not immediately 
correspond to the Greek topos for a conception of 
infinitely expanded space (and therefore of ‘being 
in space’), and is not in fact thinkable in the ancient 
Greek system of physics. Importantly, also, is the 
non-symmetric nature of space and time; as onto-
logical categories they have different structures.
Nevertheless, this historical survey renders Bren-
tano capable of learning from the ‘conflicting errors 
of philosophers’, and enables him then, to construct 
an account of space and time that is consistent with 
his philosophy and its method: Descriptive Psychol-
ogy. Although substantially disagreeing with his 
turn from the relational space/time of Leibniz to the 
absolute space/time of Newton, Brentano agrees 
with Kant that:
just as time is an intuition of inner sense given from 
the start, so space is such an intuition of the outer 
sense.24
All the same, even though through this intuition the 
individual perceiver perceives itself within an overall 
unified space, this is not to say that space and 
time exist as a necessary condition, or synthetic 
apriori, of all possible experience, as is the case in 
the mature Kantian philosophy. Space and time for 
Brentano do not ‘exist in themselves’, although they 
are intentional relations. Brentano skirts the issue 
as to whether God exists in space and time, a theo-
logical and philosophical difficulty throughout history 
which attempts to determine the arché, or beginning 
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Not merely should it be the case that no absolute 
temporal and spatial peculiarities should exist, but 
no relative specifications should exist in themselves 
either. These relativa should no longer have exist-
ence for the things in themselves, but only for the 
things as they appear to a perceiving subject.30
Therefore, the remaining project, philosophically, 
was to explain this link of ‘intentional in-existence’ 
to the continua of space and time. For Brentano, 
who was inspired by the ancient Greeks in using the 
term aesthesis, or ‘appearing’, inquired into how this 
appearing of the intentional object appeared in the 
perceiver.31 In this regard, Brentano would do well to 
consider Leibniz’s theory of perception32 as well as 
his notions of relational space and time, because:
Leibniz proposes a unified universe through 
perspectival multiplicity. Leibniz describes this unity 
as a City of God where only God has total compre-
hension, or vision by intuition (scientia visionis) of 
the entirety of the universe…. Only God can know 
the whole plan, both in the past and the future. Yet 
each monad ‘maps out’, as it were, its own neighbor-
hood. Nevertheless, each of these maps overlaps 
with other maps, making a coordinated and coinci-
dent perception of the universe…. Yet each view is 
always in relation to every other viewpoint, compos-
ing a unified whole.33
Yet Brentano would not follow this path due to his 
dedication to Aristotle. In his theory of categories, 
rightly, no two individuated entities could ‘overlap’, 
for ‘every definition, from the highest generic concept 
down as far as the last specific difference, proceeds 
monostoichetically (universally in one series) [or 
literally, of the same element].’34 This is to say that 
every genera and species has its own definition, 
which of course is ‘bounded’ with nothing outside 
of it, with no ‘overlaps’. As a consequence, Bren-
tano would then be left with the unfinished project of 
the inter-relatedness of individual consciousnesses 
– a problem, it must be pointed out, that even his 
world is only the relation between things. ‘Space 
and time are not things, but real relations.’27 Space 
is nothing other than the continuous order of coex-
istence (the relation of one object to another); time 
is the continuous order of succession (the relation 
of the before to the after).28 In this system of rela-
tions, then, the spatial and temporal determinations 
become paramount; and indeed if Leibniz’s Dynam-
ics is taken seriously, these determinations would 
be constantly changing. The mathematician would 
then be charged with describing these phenomena 
in the discrete systems of mathematics and geom-
etry. The philosopher, following Brentano, would on 
the other hand be charged with describing these 
psychic phenomena using the tools of Descriptive 
Psychology. The two systems, although incommen-
surable, are tied together with the intentional act. 
An emphasis is put on the ‘act’ for Brentano, for 
intention is also dynamic and changing - an enact-
ment of the individual will. Therefore, immediate 
experience is always for Brentano the most apodic-
tic. Through the consciousness of phenomena, each 
individual has access to spatial and temporal deter-
minations. As such, space and time do not need to 
be determined as a whole, for ‘we do nonetheless, 
possess the presentation of something spatially 
[and temporally] determinate in general, and also 
a manifold of determinations of relative spatial [and 
temporal] differences.’29 Although Brentano feels 
that Leibniz had the ‘correct insight’, the paradox 
remains as to how an individual intuition of the rela-
tional spatial outer sense and the temporal inner 
sense could be made to “correspond” to some unity 
of perception of the world. The phenomenal world 
is a continuum, and yet how can the ‘immanent’ be 
said to be a unity as well? According to Brentano, if 
we say that in regard to time and space:
 
We have to do not merely with relative [néé, rela-
tional] but also with absolute peculiarities, then 
we do not imply that a temporal or spatial point 
could exist without any connection to any others…. 
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Empire, the end of which coincided with his death 
in 1917. Vienna, specifically, was an extraordi-
nary place at this historical period. One could with 
confidence state that never before or since did 
one specific place, at one specific time, bring forth 
so many remarkable persons such as the likes of 
Fritz Mauthner, Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Oskar 
Kokoschka, Arnold Schönberg, Adolf Loos, Gustav 
Klimt, Egon Schiele, Josef Hoffmann, Karl Kraus, 
Stephen Zweig, Sigmund Freud, Ludwig Wittgen-
stein, Hermann von Helmholtz, Ernst Mach, Ludwig 
Boltzmann, Albert Einstein, Gustav Mahler, Theodor 
Herzl, Georg Trakl, Josef-Maria Olbrich, Tomas 
Masaryk, and Otto Wagner. All lived and worked in 
the city of Vienna at this specific place and time. 
Franz Brentano was one among many that burst out 
through the fissures of conservatism and ‘security’ 
before civilization would descend into the barbarism 
of WWI. But for a brief moment in time, before ‘the 
last days of humanity’,37 Vienna sparkled, and glit-
tered, and shone.
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most famous student, Edmund Husserl, inspired by 
Leibniz, was unable to fully resolve even with his 
notion of the intersubjectivity of the transcendental 
ego.
Admittedly, Brentano’s considerations on space 
were exceedingly influential in the twentieth century 
– not only in the philosophical development of the 
phenomenological school, but also the analytic in 
the form of the Vienna Circle, and in the ‘linguistic 
turn’. Furthermore, as Toulmin and Janik point out, 
Vienna at this time was a rather intimate place of 
extraordinary people that somehow blossomed or 
exploded out at the denouement of European civili-
zation.35 Many of the most influential persons in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century had at 
one time been a student of Brentano, including not 
only Husserl, but also Anton Marty, Carl Stumpf, 
Tomas Masaryk, Sigmund Freud, Alexius Meinong, 
Alois Höfler, Kasimir Twardowski, Christian von 
Ehrenfels, and Franz Hillebrand among many 
others.36 Brentano was a dedicated and beloved 
teacher, a contemplative thinker who formed a 
bridge between the completely ossified philosophy 
of his time which had got stuck in Neo-Kantianism, 
and the philosophy that would come to be known as 
‘phenomenology’. Phenomenology would  change 
the direction of how philosophy constitutes its prob-
lems entirely - the relation between the ‘physical’ and 
the ‘psychic’, the inter-relatedness of all things, as 
well as how phenomena ‘appear’ to consciousness. 
Nonetheless, one of Brentano’s most important 
contributions to twentieth-century metaphysics has 
been the re-establishment of the Aristotelian link of 
the intentional in-existence, which enables the rela-
tion between physical phenomena, and the thinking 
of by that which thinks.
To Conclude, the End of Fin-de-Siècle Vienna
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every individuated entity existed in some specific 
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